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Abstract:  This thesis examines the present day nature of Russian political and 
economic developments. The argument put forward is that President Putin has 
deliberately chosen a course of market economy, managed democracy – whereby 
an through an increasingly potent state and executive branch, Putin ensures 
sustainable growth for the Russian economy.  Good economic performance 
ensures that the President is popular with the voters, no matter that his policies are 
designed to curtail democracy. The author concludes that current political and 
economic dichotomy will result in further development of the economy and 
eventual movement towards democratic ideals.  
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Appendices  
 
1 
Historically, the Russian state has been governed by strongly autocratic 
regimes – there was the imperial system whose power had no rival in Europe, 
then there was the 70-year brutal reign of communism.  In turn, an autocratic state 
meant a strong government presence in the economy.  As Allen Lynch1 puts it, 
Russia’s vast territory and its position within the global political-military context 
and political economy, have led to the formation of a state whose internal 
structure has displayed an “intense fusion of political and economic power” both 
under Imperial and Soviet governments (10).  Many critics2 of the current regime 
argue that President Vladimir V. Putin has followed in the autocratic steps of his 
predecessors, imposing an authoritarian regime that rules over political and 
economic domains.  
This paper will examine the nature of contemporary Russian political 
economy.  Since President Putin came to power in 2000, Russian politics have 
clearly been punctuated by marked authoritarian developments.  Western media 
has focused much attention on the authoritarian tendencies of the Kremlin.  The 
international chorus of condemnation for Russia’s failed democracy has grown 
impossible to ignore.  The legislative and presidential elections in December 2003 
and March 2004, were marred by widespread irregularities and falsifications, so 
much so that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
refused to give its stamp of approval.  Yet, there is no question that the Russian 
                                                 
1 Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies and Hugh S. and Winifred B. 
Cumming Memorial Professor of International Affairs at the University of Virginia.  
2 Putin has been the target of criticism for world leaders, such as the US President Bush, 
international organizations, such as Reporters Without Borders, prominent Russian businessmen 
as well as scholarly community specializing in Russian politics – Michael McFaul, Timothy 
Colton, Pavel Baev just to name a few.  
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President Vladimir Putin remains genuinely popular with the mass public and has 
widespread support among all strata of the society.    
This study will focus on the dynamics of Russia’s politics and economy, 
analyzing political developments in light of the economy and economic progress 
in light of political trends.  The analysis of the events provided in the study shows 
that the authoritarian drift in Russian politics has had virtually no negative short-
term impact on the economy.  In fact, the government has been better equipped, 
because of state consolidation, to successfully undertake the much needed 
economic liberalization reform.  Cautionary notes on potential harmful effects of 
a strong state on the long-term sustainability of economic growth are included in 
the concluding thoughts.  
At the same time, the performance of the economy has had a direct impact 
on the Russian politics and more precisely, on the Kremlin’s ability to pursue 
policies that curtail democracy in Russia.  Economic growth and overall perceived 
improvement of the economy have boosted the popularity of Russia’s President, 
enabling him to carry on with his policy: market economy, managed democracy.3 
The conclusions outlined above are reached by addressing the following 
points: 
                                                 
3 There are many names for the almost, not quite, not really democracies of the world that exist in 
countries like Russia, Pakistan, etc. The term ‘managed democracy’ will be used here, as it 
conveys Putin’s drive to completely control over all political processes, actors and institutions in 
Russia, while at the same time insisting that Russia is a democracy (Petrov 182) See also Colton 
and McFaul “Popular Choice and Managed Democracy.”   
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- Russia’s economy has made substantial progress since 1998, and despite 
some worrying indicators of the so-called ‘Dutch Disease4’, the growth is 
projected to continue.  
- The initial growth was spurred by 1) devaluation of the Russian currency 
and 2) growing oil prices. Since then, the economy has continued to grow 
due to government’s conscious efforts, policies and reforms, as well as, 
exogenous factors such as energy prices.  
- Upon taking office in 2000, President Putin set out on the course toward 
liberal economic reforms and strengthening of the state, in short: market 
economy, managed democracy.  
- Due to centralization of power in the Kremlin and the strengthening of the 
executive branch, President Putin has been able to initiate and implement 
economic and political reforms. 
- Statistical tests point to voters’ perception of the economic situation as the 
reason for the success of President Putin’s market economy, managed 
democracy equilibrium. 
- Economic progress and growth have other advantages for an authoritarian 
regime, besides explicit voter support, such as ensuring relative calm in 
the country. 
The reader should note that this is not an argument of causality – good 
economic performance did not cause the authoritarian drift of the Russian 
                                                 
4 A phenomenon attributed to an economy that relies, in large part, on exploitation of natural 
resources for growth. This leads to the increase in value of domestic currency, in turn causing 
deterioration in terms of trade, as the domestic manufactured goods become less competitive, 
imports increase, and non-resource exports decrease. 
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political regime; reverse causality also does not apply here, authoritarian drift did 
not cause good economic performance.  In other words, this is not a case of one 
type of political or economic system necessarily implying a certain outcome for 
the other.  Instead, this is a suggestion of correlation between a) robust economy 
and ability of the government to curtail democracy and b) very strong central 
government and its ability to implement economic reforms.   
This hypothesis could serve as a basis for a longer, more extensive study.  
It is beyond the scope of this project (and the author’s ability) to gather enough 
data and research for a full blown economic analysis of a relationship between 
economic performance and centralization of power and curtailment of democracy 
in Russia.  However, research done by other scholars will be cited in support of 
the author’s claims.  To the knowledge of the author, the hypothesis and the study 
itself on the dichotomy between Russian political and economic systems is 
original and has not been examined as a separate topic by scholars in the field.  
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What Are Managed Democracy and Market Economy 
This paper will reference Robert Dahl’s definition of democracy in 
Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy because it is the most widely used and accepted 
definition.  Dahl outlines 7 main principles of a true democracy (11):  
1) Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected 
officials. 
2) Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which 
coercion is comparatively uncommon. 
3) Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials. 
4) Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the government. 
5) Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment 
on political matters broadly defined. 
6) Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, 
alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law. 
7) Citizens also have the right to form relatively independent associations or 
organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups. 
 
In name, Russia still remains a democracy – it regularly holds elections to 
choose representatives at least to the highest organs of power.  However, most of 
the seven Dahlian tenets face moderate to severe restriction in Russia.  For 
example, according to various independent election observer reports, there are 
frequent incidents of coercion of voters and candidates alike; criticism from the 
media - especially on television - has been stifled by the government; political 
party formation as well as political life for parties is becoming increasingly 
difficult.   
As the title and the thesis of this paper would suggest, the Russian political 
system could be considered democratic if combined with the term ‘managed,’ i.e. 
citizens actually elect their leaders, but the regime has total control of all facets of 
policymaking and may choose to introduce and implement various initiatives at 
any time it deems necessary.  The government may be democratically elected, but 
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its policies may work towards the increasingly authoritarian state. Therefore, 
while it is possible to construct an argument that Russia fits at least some of 
Dahl’s criteria, the analysis provided later on should elucidate why Russia should 
be considered a managed democracy. 
The market economy definition used here will reference the European 
Union’s (EU) criteria for a Market Economy Status (MES), which Russia was 
granted in 2002 by the EU and the US (“US Calls Russia”). The criteria for MES 
include: 
1) Prices, costs and inputs have to be determined by supply and demand;  
2) Firms have to have one clear set of basic accounting records, independently audited in 
line with international standards;  
3) The production costs and financial situation of firms must not be subject to significant 
distortions carried over from previous non-market economy systems;  
5) Firms are subject to bankruptcy and property laws;  
6) Exchange rate conversions must be carried out at markets rates.  
 
 The reader should note that in order to achieve these criteria, the 
government had to have had introduced a number of reforms, and maintained 
sound macroeconomic policies for a number of years.  Therefore, it could be 
concluded that even if economic growth could have been largely influenced by 
exogenous economic developments, the government had to make conscious 
efforts to gain the MES. 
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Overview 
In order to acquaint the reader with post-Soviet Russia, a short overview 
of 1992-2000 period will be provided.  The subsequent sections will examine the 
Kremlin’s consolidation of power and the performance of the Russian economy.  
The political section will address the period starting with the ascendancy of 
current President Vladimir Putin to power in January 2000.  This section is mainly 
concerned with establishing the timeline of government actions, which augmented 
its authoritarian power, as well as, timeline of reforms aimed at liberalizing the 
economy, gaining MES, and sustaining growth.   
The section on the economy will address the starting point for the period 
of consecutive growth, which occurred in the aftermath of August 1998 financial 
crash.  The section will also address the current economic situation, goals for 
further growth, and the hurdles that Russia has yet to overcome that would open 
up the way for more economic progress.  
Next, this paper will provide evidence for the suggested hypothesis – 
sustainable positive performance of the economy translated into wide-ranging 
support for President Putin, legitimizing all of his policies, including those that 
augmented the autocratic powers of the state and the executive.  On the other 
hand, increasingly potent central state and especially the executive have been able 
to quell opposition to market reforms and therefore introduce and enforce 
necessary changes.  Finally, perspectives for future economic growth and 
democratization will be considered in the sustainability section on market 
economy, managed democracy.  
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Post-Soviet Russia 
Yeltsin 
In December 1991, the former Russian Soviet Federated Socialist 
Republic (RSFSR) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) became an 
independent country as well as Soviet Union’s successor state.   
 The new Russian government, headed by a popularly elected president 
Boris Yeltsin inherited a country in state of extreme instability, which existed on 
all fronts – political, economic and social.  Nevertheless, many sincerely 
envisioned and expected that Russia would quickly make a transition from 
communism to democracy and from the state-planned to market economy.  What 
seemed to matter the most “was not the make-up of society and the economy, or 
the working of state institutions, but only solemn pronouncements of intent and 
streams of presidential decrees” (Kotkin 7). 
Yet, the optimistic projections failed to materialize.  When the Soviet 
Union fell apart, much of its institutional framework dissolved as well.  The new 
regime failed to construct effective institutions to ensure development and 
stability.  Meanwhile, a weak state allowed for strong private interest to push for 
policies and actions that were in their own benefit, in effect robbing the state blind 
during ‘privatization’ of the 1990s (Lynch 79-80).   President Yeltsin’s 
administration was almost always in constant  upheaval from the beginning of 
Russia’s independence.  Yeltsin never had good relations with the legislative 
branch - his tenure had been marked by tensions with the Communist-dominated 
parliamnet.  The conflict reached a critical point in fall 2003, when the President 
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used military force to dissolve the Duma (parliament) and called for fresh 
legislative elections as well as a referendum on the new constitution.  This 
constitution created a super-presidential system of government in Russia, placing 
most of the power with the executive branch, as the president is able to govern by 
decree5 (140-2).   
Formation of a strong executive branch led to problems almost right away.  
Yeltsin has been frequently criticized for the discretionary power he and his close 
associates wielded over the economy, which resulted in rampant corruption of 
public officials and emergence of powerful and extremely wealthy business 
oligarchs.  Ordinary Russians saw no economic improvement, and a large portion 
saw their economic situation deteriorate during Yeltsin’s tenure.  Berglof et al., 
give a nice summary of the domestic situation under Yeltsin’s administration 
“bureaucrats were only weakly accountable to the elected president and the 
Duma, and the politicians were not very responsive to the taxpayers, who, in turn 
eschewed any control by the state bureaucracy” (46).  The 2000 Human 
Development Report for the Russian Federation painted a grim picture of the 
reforms in the 1990s, alluding to capital flight and tax evasion, massive shadow 
economy and corruption, as well as inefficient banking system (Lynch 90). 
Russia’s political-economic developments in the 1990s were forged during 
the Soviet times (50).  Russia’s experience throughout the 1990s has shown that 
the road to democracy and market economy can be quite turbulent.  Yet, it seems 
unfair to assign blame for political chaos, rampant corruption and virtual rule of 
                                                 
5 A scale for measuring presidential power developed by Shugart and Carey (1992) shows that 
Russian executive branch has far more power than most other presidents in stable democracies 
(Berglof 49). 
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“the mafia” squarely to Boris Yeltsin – many of the problems were the legacy of 
communist regime, as well as the work of other powerful players surrounding 
Yeltsin.   
Financial Crisis 
Russian financial crisis erupted in August 1998.  Prior to the crisis, the 
course of Russian economy was directed by three pillars – price liberalization, 
privatization, and macroeconomic liberalization.  These could be said to have set 
the stage for the crisis, as all three were pursued halfheartedly and did not have 
enough support from the government nor the proper institutions to be 
implemented correctly (Lynch 93).  Furthermore, these policies precipitated 
deteriorations in the economy, as four-digit inflation set in due to price 
liberalization, the state virtually gave away its assets in the shoddy privatization 
deals, and macroeconomic liberalization measures reinforced and spurred 
widespread poverty (135).  
Although much has been said and debated with regard to the crisis, a few 
simple facts are enough to see the main causes and outcomes.  From 1992 to 
1998, the government borrowed extensively, with an average budget deficit of 
about 8% annually. The debt increased exponentially, due to the high interest 
rates.  Financial imbalances were exacerbated by widespread barter trade, and 
refusal of big business to pay taxes (firms usually offered to pay in kind instead). 
To top it off, the ruble exchange rate was perceived to be too high (Aslund 400).   
Following a disbursement of large aid package in July 1998, Russia’s 
request for more aid was rejected by the IMF and the World Bank and by mid 
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August the government was forced to announce the devaluation of the ruble.  
Shortly thereafter, authorities chose to allow the ruble to float against other 
currencies on the market, leading to its sharp decline in value.  In the meantime, 
the government had defaulted on its due payments on domestic treasury bills 
(GKOs).  At the peak of the crisis, Russia owed $70 billion, forcing it to freeze 
bank payments for 3 months (Aslund 400).  Russia’s economy was basically 
destroyed.  The effects of the crisis on the microeconomic level were disastrous - 
a plunge in the living standards and complete disillusion of Russian citizens with 
their government.  
Putin 
On August 9, 1999 President Boris Yeltsin appointed little-known head of 
the Federal Security Services (FSB), Vladimir Putin as his Prime Minister.  Putin 
was the fourth man to take that office in less than a year and a half.  As discussed 
above, at the time of his appointment, the government was in a state of free-fall, 
with no bottom in sight.  Corruption ran rampant, the state had defaulted on its 
debt, and conflict was stirring in the Caucuses.  
Putin’s appointment was a pragmatic choice for Yeltsin – he needed a 
strong leader who would at the same time be indebted to him for his power.  
There were a number of corruption investigations that were getting closer to 
Yeltsin and his family that needed to be stopped before serious damage occurred.  
According to former Soviet Union leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, Putin appointment 
was engineered by Yeltsin’s daughter and “special adviser” Tatiana Dyachenko, 
business oligarch Boris Berezovsky, and chief Kremlin aide Aleksandr Voloshin 
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with the purpose of protecting Yeltsin and his family, and close business 
associates (“Russia C&A 2000”).  
Putin is a career secret service agent; he had served in East Germany when 
the Cold War was at its peak and rose rapidly through the ranks.  He comes from 
St. Petersburg, and has remained fiercely loyal to those he worked with early on 
in his career. Today, most of his closest aides are drawn either from the FSB, St. 
Petersburg regional administration or better yet those who had served in both 
circles6.   
On December 31, 1999, Boris Yeltsin addressed the Russians for the last 
time from the executive seat, and that was to announce his early retirement7, in 
favor of Vladimir Putin who would take over as the interim president.  On March 
26, 2000 Putin’s rule was endorsed as Russia’s president in the general election.  
The above overview of the post-Soviet developments in Russia is 
important to the context of this study, as it sets up the situation that allowed for 
the meteoric rise of Vladimir Putin to power.  The turbulent years of Yeltsin’s 
administration were the basis for Putin’s emergence and success.  That is not to 
say that Putin did not work hard to achieve his triumphs; certainly another leader 
in his place may very well have failed in his succession of Boris Yeltsin.  
The success of Russia’s second president could be thus partially attributed 
to the failures (i.e. economy’s failure) and successes (i.e. super-presidential 
                                                 
6 Key figures in Putin first administration were first deputy prime minister and minister of finance 
Aleksei Kudrin (previously vice mayor with Putin in St Petersburg), minister for economic 
development and trade, German Gref, and Putin’s personal adviser on economic affairs, Andrei 
Illarionov.  
7 Yeltsin and Putin concluded a deal that included immunity for Yeltsin and his family from all 
criminal prosecution or any other charges that may be brought up, as well as, other benefits such 
as payment of presidential salary and provision of state housing for life.  
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constitution) of his predecessor.  President Putin has been able to capitalize on the 
economic recovery and ensuing stability to enhance his image and shore up 
support.  He has used the 1993 superpresidential constitution to begin building an 
even stronger central government and an extremely powerful executive branch.  
Putin has also used his increased power and soaring popularity to push through 
economic liberalization reforms, many of which Yeltsin conceived of but failed to 
implement because he did not wield the same power as Putin.  The reforms that 
Putin initiated put Russia on the path to market economy, managed democracy.    
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Putin Administration 
Vladimir Putin was elected as the President of the Russian Federation in 
March 2000, with 53% of the vote, a resounding victory over his closest 
challenger, communist Genady Zyuganov, who received 29% of the vote.   
 Once he took office, Putin moved forward, introducing a mix of liberal 
political and economic initiatives. However, the authoritarian trend became 
noticeable almost immediately.  In his millennium address on December 30, 1999, 
Putin emphasized that “a strong state is not an anomaly that should be gotten rid 
of.  Quite the contrary, they [Russians] see it as a source and a guarantor of order 
and the initiator and main driving force of any change” (Putin 1999).  His 
subsequent Addresses to the Federal Assembly (state of the union address) 
emphasized economic growth within the context of rule-of-law state8.   
 In 2004 Address, Putin stated future goals for Russia to be “doubling our 
gross domestic product over the next decade (this goal was actually introduced in 
2003), reducing poverty, increasing people’s prosperity and modernizing the 
armed forces.”  All but one of the priorities are economic in nature and the other 
emphasizes the strength of the state.  In the 2005 Address, Putin emphasized the 
development of democracy and civil society as essential to developing a strong 
and competitive state.  
 
 
                                                 
8 The transcripts of all speeches are available at www.kremlin.ru; here the reference is particularly 
to the May 2005 and April 2004 speeches.  In his 2005 Address, Putin refers to the 2004 address, 
which was mainly concerned with economic growth, as a component of 2005 speech focused on 
democracy and political development.  Putin asserted that the 2 should serve as a unified program 
of action for the next decade.  
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President’s Approval  
 Before beginning the sections on Putin’s policies, it is necessary to briefly 
address the run up and the results of the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections.  In 
both elections, polls indicated that President Putin would secure a resounding 
victory.  In 2000, a poll done by VTsIOM (which became the Levada Center in 
2003) gave Putin 53% of the vote.  According to the same survey, when asked 
what was most essential for Russia at that point, 71% wanted a “strong leader,” 
and 59% envisioned a “strong state” (Shevtsova 73).  Lilia Shevtsova attributes 
this trend to society associating weak leadership and a weak state with Yeltsin’s 
tenure (73).  At this point, Putin was only in office for several months, and his 
policies and initiatives had almost no bearing on how the general public viewed 
him – he had only his image.   What Putin’s election campaign lacked in 
substance, it made up for in image.  Putin’s platform was vague, but he made sure 
to drive one point home - he was a sensible choice, especially when the threat of 
communist past loomed large personified by Zyuganov (“Russia C&A 2001”).  In 
his only direct appeal to the voters, he published an open letter in February 2000.  
He promised an increased role for the state, more market reforms and appealed to 
populist sentiment with the idea of social justice (Shevtsova 72).  
 When the time for presidential elections came in March 2004, the voters 
had a full term to evaluate the incumbent president.  Both the trends towards 
market economy and managed democracy were clearly visible.  And it appears 
that the average Russian voter was fine with that.  In February 2003, the Levada 
Center surveys showed that 95% of United Russia voters and an average of 60% 
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or more of voters supporting other parties were prepared to vote Putin into the 
second term in office (Shevtsova 295).  Putin showed a substantial improvement 
in his election victory in 2004, winning a resounding first round victory with 73% 
of the vote.  Although there were obvious irregularities, most observers agree (and 
results of the pre-election polls indicate) that Putin’s victory was all but assured 
based on his personal popularity.  Clearly, the President, if not his regime, is 
rather popular.  Not only has Putin been popularly endorsed in two elections, but 
his approval ratings have remained high during all of the years that he has been 
office.   
 The following graph gives an average of 12 months popular support for 
the years that President Putin has been in power. 
 
Source: Data from Levada Center, author’s calculations for average 
Managed Democracy 
 Since President Putin took over the Kremlin in 2000, his systematic 
approach has been to “consolidate, broaden and strengthen his grip on power and 
his control over the policy-making apparatus” (“Russia C&A” 2003).  The 
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President is aware that his assault on democracy has not gone unnoticed.  In fact, 
he has addressed it time and again, in his public speeches.  The 2005 Address to 
the Federal Assembly focuses almost exclusively on the political situation in 
Russia.  Putin has acknowledged that he has increased the powers of the state and 
centralized power, yet he puts his policies in the context of ‘us against them’ – 
those who do not want to see Russia rise to the status of a great power criticize us, 
but we are moving along on the path of economic growth and democratization.  
Putin claims that he considers  
“the development of Russia as a free and democratic state to be our main political and 
ideological goal…The objectively difficult processes going on in Russia are increasingly 
becoming the subject of heated ideological discussions…connected with…freedom and 
democracy” (“Address to the Assembly 2005”). 
 
And yet it clear that however one perceives political developments in 
Russia, whether good or bad, they fall far short of the democratic objectives.  The 
President has used a 3-prong approach to strengthen the state: 1) an increase in 
powers of the executive, and the executive’s own support base in the legislature, 
2) weaker regional governments, 3) clamp down on the media to suppress any 
opposition.  Basically, Putin strengthened the political authority at the central 
level and away from the regional level, and in the executive branch at the expense 
of the legislative branch, while ensuring that there was no widespread public 
opposition to his initiatives. 
It is hard to pinpoint the exact Kremlin action that signaled the moment 
when democracy started to go awry9.  This study will adopt April 3, 2001 as the 
                                                 
9 Some scholars suggest that December 2000 parliamentary elections were the first sign of worry; 
at the time it was evident that many seats were simply bought by those who had the money to do 
so (Shlapentokh 391).  
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benchmark from which the Kremlin’s power started to markedly increase, while 
democracy started to diminish.  The following timeline presents some of the main 
‘milestones’ in the 3-pronged strategy to shore up his power: 
1) Media – On April 3, 2001 the Russian public openly protested Putin’s 
policy regarding the only independent television station in Russia, NTV.  The 
government’s attack on NTV began back in June 2000, when the authorities 
arrested Vladimir Gusinsky, the owner of NTV.  Following months of legal action 
against Gusinsky, the television station as well as, the affiliated popular 
newspaper Segodnia and journal Itogi were shut down by the government 
(Shlapentokh 393).  Although NTV staff almost exclusively went to work at 
another independent channel, TV-6, by 2002 that channel as well was taken over 
by the authorities.  The President has thus been able to exert control over the most 
popular news medium in Russia.  This action violates Dhalian tenet #6. 
2) Legislature - The next event was the promulgation in July 2001 of the 
law that limited the number of political parties.  The administration argued that 
the law made for less chaos and improved regulation of private fundraising.  
However, the new legislation at the same time enhanced the Kremlin’s ability to 
control and manipulate political process by making parties dependent on state 
financing (“Russia C&A 2001”).  This action violates Dhalian tenet #7. 
3) Executive - In September 2002, President Putin effectively limited the 
competition for the executive power, when he introduced a bill that gave a huge 
advantage to incumbents up for re-election.  The bill stipulated that in order for a 
candidate to be able to register to stand in the elections, he or she must collect 2 
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million or more signatures in endorsement.  This would be quite an undertaking 
even for a national party, let alone a technocrat.  Meanwhile, as far as the 
President is concerned, he would be exempt from the requirement. This action 
violates Dhalian tenet #4. 
4) Executive & Judiciary - In late October 2003, the government 
launched a campaign against an oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his 
company Yukos, which ended in 2004 with the state gaining control over the 
main production unit of the company.  The media generally attributed the 
persecution of Khodorkovsky to politics – i.e. the oligarch was interfering too 
much in the government, attempting to buy seats in parliament and lobbying for 
favorable legislature and even hinting at standing in the race for the Kremlin in 
2008.  The most likely explanation for what is popularly known as the Yukos 
Affair is that the company interfered with the state’s energy policy.10  Regardless 
of the reasons for intervention, the Yukos Affair was the loudest signal to 
businesses that the state may choose to intervene in private sector and will do so if 
it finds so necessary.  Furthermore, the leaning on the court system (although the 
charges had sound legal footing, the handling of the case left on-lookers queasy) 
dispelled any myths of independent judiciary.  This action violates Dhalian tenet 
#5. 
5) Executive - Putin won re-election by a landslide, however international 
observers did not certify the March 2004 election (or for that matter the December 
2003 legislative elections) as legitimate.  According to the reports, there were 
                                                 
10 See Harley Blazer, “The Putin Thesis and Russian Energy Policy.” Post Soviet Affairs. 21.3 
(2005): 210-225. 
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widespread voting irregularities, voter intimidation and fixing of the vote. In the 
legislative elections, United Russia party and 2 other pro-Putin parties won 295 
seats, 5 short of the two-thirds majority which is required for approval of changes 
in the constitution. Thess actions violate Dhalian tenets #2-4. 
6) Legislature - On December 12, 2004, Putin signed into law a number 
of his proposals that significantly undercut democracy.  Putin attributed the 
reforms directly to the Beslan massacre - the worst terrorist attack in modern 
Russian history.11  The law, which was endorsed unanimously by the parliament, 
got rid of the popular election of local governors, replacing direct election with 
local legislature approval of governor appointees recommended by the President. 
This action violates Dhalian tenets #1-4. 
Furthermore, Putin also exponentially increased the presence of military 
and security personnel in administrative positions- two thirds of presidential staff 
have background in security service (Lynch 130), while 25% of the total political 
elite has some background in the military (160).  Putin has also ensured that 
business community only acts in accordance with Kremlin’s policy direction 
(130).  He has managed to consolidate the legislature - in December 2001, Putin’s 
Interregional Movement Unity (Medved) and Fatherland All Russia (OVR) 
merged and formed the United Russia party, which controls most of the seats in 
parliament and has supported virtually every move and policy undertaken by the 
President.   
                                                 
11 On September 1, 2004 terrorists took over a school in Beslan, the siege ended several days later 
with more than 400 people killed, more than half of whom were children. 
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It is evident from the sequence of events provided above that President 
Putin has deliberately consolidated power since his days in office.  Neither 
international condemnation of his authoritarian tendencies, nor domestic and 
foreign political setbacks have stopped the President from proceeding with his 
goals.   
The first year of Putin’s second term in office was nothing short of 
disastrous a string of crises occurred one after another – there was the 
assassination of Chechnya’s President Akhmad Kadyrov in May 2004, then there 
were widespread demonstration against an unpopular welfare reform, a mini 
banking crisis, and foreign policy defeats in Abkhazia and Ukraine, just to name a 
few.  Yet the government introduced new political measures designed to 
strengthen the state (Petrov 181).  
Russia has moved away from rather than towards democracy by 
introducing measures to curtail political party effectiveness and, the power of the 
regional governments, limiting judiciary’s independence, and increasing state 
control over the media.  As Michael McFaul12 puts it, Putin “has not radically 
violated the 1993 constitution, cancelled elections or arrested hundreds of 
political opponents…However, if the formal institutions remain in place, the 
actual democratic content has eroded considerably on Putin’s watch” (308). 
 The reader should take note that along with these measures designed to 
enhance Putin’s and state’s power, the President also introduced a number of 
reforms designed to improve the economy, most important of which were the land 
                                                 
12 Senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, a professor of political science at Stanford University, a 
nonresident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment.  
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reforms that established principles of private property and tax reforms.  In fact, 
the economy is one of the few spheres that are not directly under the control of the 
President, being subject instead to the Prime Minister (although the president may 
dismiss him as he pleases) (162). 
Thus, the effects of recentralization of power at the Kremlin should not be 
exaggerated. As Allen Lynch points out, most of the economy functions 
separately from the state, private businesses prosper and lobby the government for 
their own private interests, and finally the elections are held and thus popular 
opinion does count13 (Lynch 162).  
Market Economy  
While political developments have attracted mixed reviews, and at that 
more negative than positive, there is no question that the Russian economy has 
witnessed a number of very positive developments since Putin took office.  First, 
it should be pointed out that the economic recovery from the 1998 financial crisis 
actually began before Putin was installed as the interim president, and was 
spurred by external developments such as ruble devaluation and rising oil prices.  
At the start of his tenure, Putin faced rampant inflation, declining 
productivity and investment, budget crisis and a towering foreign debt (Shevtsova 
328).  By the end of his first term, Russia had achieved steady economic growth 
and dealt successfully with its main macroeconomic problems – the government 
had a balanced budget and there were foreign reserves in the Central Bank 
coffers.  Russia also overcame non-payment problems, and substantially reduced 
                                                 
13 Due to poplar protests, housing and utilities price reforms had to be postponed before the last 
elections (Lynch 162).  
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its foreign debt.  The impressive part was that Russia’s recovery was broad based, 
most major industrial sectors, construction and service sectors all recorded strong 
growth.  Furthermore, 2003 Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) report points out that growth was strong even with low oil 
prices of $19 per barrel (“Russian Economic Survey”).  By 2004, Russia also 
achieved substantial improvements in the investment climate and reached the 
minimum investment level rating of 3 main international rating agencies - 
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investor Service and Fitch ratings. 
The market economy reforms were initiated in April 2000, and were 
known as the “Gref Program,” as a number of liberal economists were led by 
young liberal lawyer German Gref.  After Putin was inaugurated as president in 
May 2000, Gref became the Minister of Economic Development and Trade and 
“Gref Program” was officially adopted as the reform plan by July 2000.  From 
2000 to 2003, there was a steady flow of reform adopted by the Russian 
government, with majority of most important laws approved during the first half 
of July 2001 (Aslund 403-4).  
Between 1998 and 2004, Russia made substantial progress in fiscal, 
structural and institutional reforms.14  The following table addresses these 
achievements, as well as, areas where Russia has yet to achieve substantial 
progress.  
Fiscal Policy As the new government took office it started to implement a 
prudent fiscal policy - tightening the budgetary control - which 
                                                 
14 Also see Appendix A for graphical representation of some of Russia’s reforms in comparison to 
other emerging market economies in the region.  
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helped to eliminate barter trade and increased control over the 
budgetary revenues from the regions.   
 
The new Budget Code was adopted in 2000, which did much to 
improve state’s management of finances (Berglof 406-7).  
 
Currently the budget is in surplus, although the current 
relaxation of spending (in the face of increasing oil revenues) is 
a worrying sign. Up to 2004, the government had strict 
restrictions on non-interest spending (Efremova 7). 
Tax reform Radical tax reform could be considered as one of the most 
important and progressive pieces of legislature adopted by the 
government during the reform period.   
 
President Putin abolished progressive tax, instead introducing a 
flat income tax rate of 13%, which had an astonishing impact 
on tax revenues and improved business climate15 (Lynch 161).  
The new tax diminished disincentives to work, as well as, to 
report taxes.  Overall tax burden on businesses was also 
substantially diminished (Aslund 404-6). 
 
The government’s current efforts in tax policy are concentrated 
on redirecting the tax burden away from agents of production to 
                                                 
15 This move also redirected the flow of tax revenues from the local governments to the federal 
coffers (Lynch 161), while on individual basis the new tax yielded 50% more revenue per person 
(Lynch 197).  
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final output.  This is to be achieved through improvement of tax 
administration, optimization of the structure of fiscal burden on 
the economy and decrease of subsidies (Efremova 7).  
 
 
Private Sector 
Involvement 
 
The private sector accounted for 70% of the GDP in 2004 
(Efremova 6). 
 
Deregulation In 2001, the Russian government introduced legislation that 
became known as “deregulation” of the economy.  The 
legislation reduced discretion of the state authorities and 
detailed the responsibilities and boundaries of power of the 
officials in an attempt to curb rent-seeking activities and 
introduce greater accountability of the officials (Berglof 102).  
 
Other components include new laws on standardization for 
products, firm registration, protection of entrepreneurs’ rights, 
which all aim at increasing efficiency and decreasing barriers 
for the business sector (Aslund 408-9).  
Legal and 
Regulatory 
Framework 
Both legal and regulatory frameworks improved, particularly in 
registration of legal entities and control over their operations 
and the number of activities requiring legal licensing.   
 
At the same time there are many economic regulations that are 
contradictory and therefore have a negative impact on growth.   
Judicial 
Reform 
The legislature for protection of private property has been 
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enacted, but rules are rarely enforced due to the corrupt and 
weak judicial branch (Berglof 70). Some positive developments 
have been in expediency of litigation, yet the problem occurs 
here with enforcement of judicial decisions (Aslund 412).   
  
Putin has focused on correcting this problem and since 2001, 
the government has coordinated legislation overseeing the 
judicial branch, in addition to increasing transparency of 
judicial appointments and increased legal responsibility.  At the 
same time, this reform package also ensured tighter control by 
the central government over the judicial branch (Berglof 73-4).   
 
From 2000 to 2004, the legal base for future reform was 
established, adopting judicial regulation laws such as: Criminal 
Procedure Code, Civil Procedure Code, Arbitration Procedure 
Code, Arbitration Procedure Core, Administrative Infraction 
Code.  Roles and responsibilities of the judges were enhanced.  
Taking note of the international best practices, mechanisms and 
settlements for dispute regulation were introduced (Efremova 
9). 
 
The role and image of the judiciary has been significantly 
undermined by the 2003 Yukos Affair case, as discussed in the 
earlier section. Besides the heavy state interference, other 
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problems include overburdening of judicial authorities due to 
high demand, leading to non-observance of procedural time 
limits.  
 
The key objectives remain an increase in the efficiency and 
therefore of confidence in the system, improvement in 
impartiality and quality of the rulings, and improvement of 
business practices and ethic standards connected with judiciary 
(9).   
Ownership 
Rights 
From the very beginning, establishment and protection of 
private property was adopted by the Russian government as one 
of the basic tenets of market reform.   
 
In 2001, new Land Code was introduced that legalized private 
ownership of land, and in 2002 the Duma finally approved the 
new law on privatization of agricultural land. The new Civil 
Code establishes protection of private property (Berglof 409-
10).   
 
However, privatization did not receive a great deal of attention 
during Putin’s first term (410), but beginning in late 2005 –
early 2006, it seems that government is much more eager to 
attract foreign and domestic investors to various sectors.  
Banking 
Sector Reform 
Although the government adopted in 2001 banking sector 
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reform legislation, the changes have been slow to address the 
structural problems.   
 
Even though Russia is unlikely to face another banking crisis in 
the foreseeable future, the possibility does exist.  The 
combination of ruble appreciation and leveling off of the oil 
prices could quickly dry up liquidity and undermine the already 
shaky confidence of depositors and lenders (Berglof 119).  
 
Also, the authorities are yet to establish clear bankruptcy 
procedures (Efremova 7). 
Establishment 
of OSF 
In 2004, the government established Oil Stabilization Fund 
(OSF) to tax and save excess oil revenues, to prevent the 
economy from overheating and to use the funds for government 
purposes, such as repayment of debt and mitigation of a sharp 
fall in the oil prices (Efremova 7). 
Administrative 
Reforms 
These reforms are especially important since the state plays 
such a central role in the economy.  Administrative reforms 
were launched after 2004 elections, with an assumption that it 
would take 2-3 years to complete and the same amount of time 
to fully adopt externally to the new regulations.  Yet according 
to the experts, only 10-15% of government’s plans have been 
implemented so far (Efremova 8).  
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The main objectives of administrative reform are increased 
efficiency of the government, improvement in quality of 
decisions and greater transparency. Additional efforts should be 
directed towards reducing corruption, and improvement of 
management processes (8). 
 
In March 2004, a new, three-tier structure of federal executive 
authorities was introduced, so that ministries are responsible for 
strategic and political interests of the state, federal services 
provide supervisory role and federal agencies carry out 
services, manage property and keep registers. These changes 
have failed initially, with ministries having a say in decisions of 
authorities under them, while second and third tier levels report 
directly to the prime minister, which is a blatant contradiction 
of the reform (8).  
 
Although the number of ministries was reduced, the number of 
federal authorities swelled from 54 to more than 70. 
Competence level remains a problem, while drastic reduction in 
deputy ministers and a large number of resignations of 
department heads, complicate administrative tasks. In addition, 
there has been an increase in bureaucracy at all executive 
levels.  Differences at the ministerial level have led to 
inconsistencies in economic policy (8).  
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Moreover, the state continues to use administrative leverage 
against businesses, as evidenced by the Yukos Affair.  
Pension 
Reform 
Pension reform was announced after 2004 elections, although 
implementation has been lacking, especially after massive 
popular protests against the new measures (Efremova 7)   
 
Key objectives include gradual increase of retirement age and 
introduction of contributions from the employees (7).  
 
In 2005, the government reduced the Unified Social Tax (UST) 
by 10.5%, which led to deficit in the pensions fund amounting 
to $2.68 billion – this is being covered with funds from the OSF 
(7). 
Social policy Social policy had not been on government’s radar until recently 
as it requires expenditure currently not available (money which 
is even now diverted to military and state administration) 
(Efremova 7).  
 
Areas to be addressed include: 
- housing and utility reform 
- healthcare 
- education 
- culture 
- social security 
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- monetization of social benefits  
Although in 2005, President Putin launched “national 
priorities” which include education, health and housing 
improvements, the program for implementation of these 
improvements is very vague. 
To be 
continued 
(maybe)… 
At the same time, the following have a long way to go to reach 
the standards of developed countries: 
- antimonopoly reforms  
- natural monopolies 
- structural reforms of enterprise 
 
It should be noted that most reforms were initiated in the 2000-01 period, and 
by 2004 there was a noticeable drop off in government’s efforts (Shevtsova 329).   
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What Does This Mean? 
Ratings of Russian Regime 
The timeline of authoritarian drift in the Russian politics provided above 
serves as a representation of the managed democracy claim made in this paper.  
However, should the reader be not convinced that democracy has failed to take 
root under President Putin, here is a short overview of some democracy ratings.  
The “Voice and Accountability” (VA) indicators formulated by Kaufmann 
et al. measure the citizen’s ability to select their governments, the data is drawn 
from 7 major sources, including The Economist Intelligence Unit, and the US 
Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices among others. 
Scores are measured on a 5 point scale, with -2.5 being the least open polity and 
+2.5 being the most open polity.  Freedom House’s (FH) freedom ratings are not 
quite as meticulously researched but provide data over a long time span.  In 
addition, these ratings are most widely used for comparative politics analysis.  FH 
scores range from 1 ‘most free’ to 7 ‘least free’.  Steven Fish16 ran correlations for 
the VA and FH scores, with results showing an extremely high degree of 
correlation of .95 for 147 countries (22-3).  The following scores reported are 
from my own research: 
In 2004, Russia’s VA score was -0.81.  Although it is higher than the 
average rating (-1.04) within the post communist region, Russia is only ahead of 
Azerbaijan, Belarus and 5 Central Asian countries.  Not only does Russia rank 
low in the post-communist region, but it has also experienced marked decline 
throughout the years that the survey has been conducted (1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 
                                                 
16 Associate Professor of Political Science at the UC Berkley.  
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2004). Russia was rated at -0.36 in 1996 and as low as -0.26 in 1998; the year that 
Putin took over, 2000, the rating jumped to -0.44. 
            Russia's VA Scores 1996-2004  
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
-0.36 -0.26 -0.44 -0.44 -0.81 
Source: Voice and Accountability Ratings 
In 2005, Russia’s FH political rights rating fell to 6 (in 2004 it was still 5) 
and its status changed from ‘Partly Free’ to ‘Not Free.’ According to the Freedom 
House report, the score change was due to the “virtual elimination of influential 
political opposition parties within the country and the further concentration of 
executive power.”  Similarly to the VA scores, Russia’s status was changed from 
a 3 in 1999 to a 4 in 2000.  
Therefore, although there is an actual debate on Russia’s commitment to 
democracy, and on whether Russia could be classified as a democracy, the 
statistics clearly show that a) Russia is NOT a democracy in conventional sense 
and b) since 2000, when President Putin took over the Kremlin’s leadership, 
Russia’s political freedom and accountability has been sliding on a continuous 
downward spiral17.  However, at the same time, Russia may still be classified as a 
managed democracy, as it maintains democratic aspects such as popular elections.  
How Do Russians Feel? 
International ratings of Russian regime clearly paint quite a grim picture 
of democratization in Russia.  What is the situation like on the ground? 
                                                 
17 Those defending the current regime, often point out the subjective nature of the ‘democracy’ 
scores.  Fore example, Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Tresiman point out that in 2002, Russian media 
scored 30 on a FH scale of 0 being the best and 40 being the worst. Yet at the same time, Iran 
received a better score, while its government had banned 40 newspapers in 2years, imprisoned 
more journalists than any other state, while the punishments included flogging (34).  
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The latest World Values Survey for Russia conducted in 1999, indicated 
that Russian respondents tend to perceive a democratic system of government as a 
less appealing way to govern the country.  Respondents also indicated that they 
think that the economy performs poorly under a democratic government.  When 
compared to respondents in 39 other mid-level developing countries, Russian 
respondents are least likely to agree that democracies have problems but are still 
better than other political systems18 (Zimmerman 187).  These opinions were 
expressed prior to Putin’s regime, which leaves us to address the question: how 
much has changed? 
In early March 2006, the Levada Center, Russia’s largest independent 
opinion survey organization, released its general survey of the Russian 
population.19  According to the survey, 41% believe that the country is headed in 
the right direction, while 44% believe that is not.  The survey notes that this is an 
improvement on the last year’s results, when the numbers were 31% and 57% for 
the 2 categories respectively.  But importantly, when asked about specifics, 
Russians seem to be less optimistic.  An astonishing 70% do not believe that the 
economy is on the right track, while only 25% do.  As far as their individual 
economic status, when asked about how their economic situation will change, 
35% either believe or expect that their financial situation will deteriorate, while 
60% do not expect any changes – that means that more than 9 out of 10 Russians 
do not expect any positive developments for themselves!  
                                                 
18 Data could be accessed at www.worldvaluessurvey.org 
19 Full survey available at www.levadacenter.ru; partial results in English could be accesses at 
www.russaivtoes.org 
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Nevertheless, President Putin’s approval ratings remain as high as ever, 
with 75% supporting him and 23% disapproving in February 2006.  When asked 
how important is a particular figure to the overall situation in Russia, from 0 (not 
at all) to 5 (very important), President Putin is at 3.99, the government and 
President’s administration receive 3.4 each; significantly less important are 
political parties (2.75).  President Putin is still the most trusted politician with 
46%.  Concerning electability, 47% would vote for the United Russia party if the 
elections were held today, with its closest challenger being the communists with 
17% of support.  It should be noted that United Russia has been continually 
making gains, while the communists have been continually losing votes.  So this 
survey would suggest that the majority of Russian citizens support an 
authoritarian regime. 
Not so, according to the 2004 New Russia Barometer (NRB) carried out in 
conjunction by the Levada Center and Rose et al.  The NRB survey finds that 3 
out of 4 Russians endorse democracy, while 9 out of 10 do not approve of 
dictatorship.  The respondents were asked about political regimes with a reference 
point of 1 (complete dictatorship) to 10 (democracy). The average rating for the 
democratic preference was 7.4, a highly positive number.  The mean rating for the 
current political regime was much lower at 5.3 (Rose 200).  
The same survey finds that despite the fact that the average Russian 
citizen’s perception of the regime as related to their ideal is far off, that does not 
necessarily influence their endorsement of the current regime.  After the 2004 
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presidential election, fully 65% viewed the political regime in a positive light 
while 10% were neutral and only 25% had negative feelings on the subject.   
It is more impressive that these numbers have been continually rising 
since President Putin took office.  After the 2000 presidential election, those 
viewing the regime negatively outnumbered those who had a positive outlook, 
and in 2001 a plurality had a positive opinion but the median respondent was 
neutral.  These findings are in sharp contrast to the early 1990s, when nearly three 
quarters of the respondents had negative perception of the government (Rose 
202).  
As a final thought, according to the survey reported by Timothy Colton 
and Michael McFaul,20 respondents interviewed in 2000, reported that if they 
were forced to choose between democratic governance and economic 
development an astonishing number favored economic development.  Democracy 
was preferred over a strong state by only 6% and over economic growth by just 
2% (222-3).  
Attitudes toward Trade-off between Democracy and 
Economic Growth in 2000; N = 1,755 
Question and Response Percent 
Is it possible for Russia to have both democracy 
and economic growth, or must we chose one or the 
other?   
Can Have Both 63 
Must Choose 27 
Don't Know 10 
What is more important right now - economic 
growth or democracy?   
Economic growth 55 
                                                 
20 The survey was contracted to Demoscope Group at the Russian Academy of Sciences; 1,919 
voters were interviewed in November December 1999 and of those 1,842 were re-interviewed 
after the Duma elections in December and 1,748 were re-interviewed after the presidential 
elections in Mach 2000. 
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Democracy 2 
Equally Important (volunteer response) 38 
Don't know 5 
Source: Colton, McFaul. Popular Choice and Managed Democracy, Pg 223.  
Therefore, it is not that Russians disapprove of democratic values or have 
a different perception of democracy than those it the West.  These surveys would 
suggest that Russians prefer to support the current regime for whatever reasons, 
rather than opt for conceptual democracy that they believe existed under Yeltsin 
(and indeed Russia’s democracy ratings were higher during the administration of 
Boris Yeltsin).  After a decade of economic and political upheavals in the name of 
democracy, Russians are looking for a respite and that is what President Putin is 
more than willing to provide.  
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Russian economy 
The current growth of the Russian economy took off after the financial 
crisis of August 1998.  The 1998 default obliged the government to accept the 
need of reforms in the country (Aslund 400).  The government was forced to cut 
back on public expenditure, reinstitute money as the only means of tax payment, 
and actually apply the tax regulations to large businesses.  The financial 
stabilization and elimination of barter trade were the most influential catalysts in 
the post-1998 growth of the Russian economy, while, the use of money (instead 
of barter) stimulates competition (Aslund 401).  
In the aftermath of the crisis, thanks to the liquidity created by the ruble 
devaluation and high oil prices, the growth has affected many more sectors, 
industries and regions in Russia than ever before (Berglof 1).  The sharp increase 
in oil prices – between January 1999 and summer 2000, the price of oil jumped 
from $19 per barrel to $35 per barrel (Lynch 196).  Rising oil prices led to 
increased output, which in turn allowed firms to use the revenues (and not the 
weak financial system) to introduce technology that improved production 
efficiency.  At the same time, investments in non-oil sectors have increased total 
factor productivity21 and real wages, which propelled consumption (“Article IV” 
5). 
Since 1998, Russia’s GDP has grown an average of 6% or more.  All other 
economic indicators, such as inflation, trade balance, current account balance, 
                                                 
21 Measure of the output of the economy relative to the quantity of primary factor inputs; it is often 
referred to as a residual that measures efficiency of an economy after inputs have been accounted 
for. 
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have improved as well. This has been the first time that Russia had achieved 
sustained growth since it began its transition in 1991.  
Russian Real GDP Growth, 1997 - 2005 (in %) 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
0.8 -4.9 5.4 9 5 4.7 7.3 7.1 5.8 
 
Russian Inflation, 1997 - 2005 (in %) 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
14.7 27.7 85.7 20.8 21.5 15.7 13.7 10.9 10.3 
 
Russian Current Account Balance, 1997 - 2005 (in $bln) 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
-0.08 0.22 24.61 46.84 33.8 29.12 35.41 60.11 NA 
Source: PRS Yearbook, Russian Federation, 2006.  
 
Philip Hanson22 suggests that institutional reforms had little to do with 
short-term growth.  “We should not expect the impressive Russian economic 
recovery from 1999 to date to be the result primarily of the array of reforms 
initialed in recent years. Rather external stimuli, macroeconomic stabilization, and 
the general perception of a more stable political regime with a reasonably 
business-friendly agenda account for the rapid growth of the Russian economy” 
(427).   
So although there is a debate on what has been the driving force behind 
Russia’s economic recovery, there is a consensus that the economy has managed 
to overcome the 1998 crisis.  Regardless of whether government policies had an 
impact on the actual recovery and growth, it is important to acknowledge that the 
Putin administration has pragmatically sought to implement many market 
reforms, and has been much more successful at that than the Yeltsin 
administration.  
                                                 
22 Emeritus Professor of the Political Economy and Russia and Eastern Europe, the University of 
Birmingham, UK.  
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Current Situation 
There is no doubt that the Russian economy made a dramatic turnaround 
since the financial crisis – between 1998 and 2005, the GDP expanded by an 
estimated 48%, while the real income expanded by the no less than an impressive 
46% (“Russian Economic Report”).  In 2005, Russia recoded its seventh year of 
sustained economic growth. In 2000-2004, Russia averaged a 6.6% GDP growth, 
and during that time, per capita GDP more than doubled from $1772 to $4040.                            
The following is a summary of the Article IV of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) consultation with the Russian Federation completed in 
September 200523. It is important to note that while the energy sector has been the 
driving factor behind growth since 2003, modernization and productivity growth 
in other sectors have made important contributions to the latest figures, as well as, 
sound macroeconomic policies on behalf of the government.  While the growth in 
import substitution, which helped propel the recovery began to subside, sizeable 
and sustained terms-of-trade gains as well as increased political and economic 
stability have led a broad based recovery (see graph) (5).   
 
 
                                                 
23 The Article IV consultation is viewed as the most comprehensive and thorough report on an 
economy.  
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Also, significant improvements were recorded in the balance of payments, 
due to increased foreign reserves ($152 billion), which has allowed the 
government to reduce its debt (11).  
Overall, government has administered sound fiscal policy, despite the 
recent relaxation on spending of excess oil revenues.  The key has been to tax and 
save excess oil revenue, which the government has done.  The IMF also noted that 
authorities have been following the recommended structural and tax system 
reforms.  Long-term structural reform is well grounded, especially government’s 
intentions to improve the investment climate.  Yet, the IMF is concerned with the 
stalling pace of these reforms (15-16).  
Monetary policy, directed by the Russian Central Bank (CBR) has caused 
concern, because of officials’ insistence to continue targeting both inflation and 
exchange rate.  The IMF has recommended that the CBR concentrate its energies 
on inflation rate targeting (15).  
Russia has also made progress on the microeconomic level – the poverty 
rate has decreased by half since the 1998 crisis, while regional disparities have 
also diminished. Real wages increased by 11.25% in 2004, which brought unit 
labor costs to about pre-1998 crisis level.  The rate of unemployment fell to 7.5% 
(8).  In 2004, the official number of people living beyond the poverty line fell 
below 20% for the first time (“Russian Economic Report” 10).   
Nevertheless, there are some worrying signs.  The deceleration in growth 
has been mainly due to the decrease in oil output and investments that could be 
attributed to supply disruption and a negative investment climate that occurred as 
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a result of the Yukos Affair.  Furthermore, due to technological resource 
constraints and lack of new proven oil reserves, Russia is unlikely to be able to 
increase oil output.  In addition there are signs of weakening real wage and 
consumption growth.  As a result of these factors, GDP cannot grow by more than 
5-6% annually, without causing inflation (“Article IV” 6, 8).  Inflation is a 
concern, with core inflation24 holding at 10-11% since 2002 (9). Net capital 
outflows increased in 2004, which could be largely attributed to the Yukos Affair 
(11). 
The World Economic Forum report in October 2005 states the following: 
“reform has stalled, with Russia seeing significant increases in government 
centralization, income inequality and corruption.” The report notes that while the 
economy is currently strong, “there are fears that high oil prices will be used to 
finance a spending boom that will become a substitute for legislative and 
economic reform.” 
Current Problems 
 Russia faces a number of challenges that it needs to overcome in order to 
achieve President Putin’s goals for the economy.  The Russian big businessmen, 
the so-called oligarchs, control more than 40% of Russian industry.  They have 
also extracted windfall profits (unearned) from domestic and foreign sales of oil 
and gas, concealing these revenues abroad.  The result is extreme income 
inequality which has impeded economic efficiency and encouraged the spread of 
corruption (Hardt 15).  The OECD suggests that sustained economic growth could 
be achieved only when Russia achieves reduction in income inequality through 
                                                 
24 Core inflation excludes prices of volatile goods such as oil. 
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tax reforms (“Russian Economic Survey”). The Russian government has 
embarked on this path, yet problems remain in unifying value-added tax and 
lowering the tax base (Address to the Federal Assembly 2005).  
 Russia’s economy, despite the progress made in diversification and 
development of various sectors, is still very much dependent on energy revenues.  
Half of the value of Russian exports comes from oil and gas sales.   
An increase in oil prices of $10 would lead to a 4% increase in the GDP (“Russian 
Economic Survey”).  
 
The government must find ways to transfer these funds to the human 
resource programs if it plans to achieve its goals of human capital development.  
Yet these programs have been given a low priority in the 2005 budget, at the 
expense of military and state security spending.  
 At the same time, the government needs to increase investment into the 
economy and particularly into the energy sector to expand its production and 
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exports to continue on the economic growth path and to become a global energy 
power (Hardt 17).  In the 2005 Address to the Federal Assembly, President Putin 
stated: “Russia is extremely interested in a major inflow of private, including 
foreign, investment. This is our strategic choice and strategic approach.”  Yet 
attracting investment remains a problem with gaps in the legal framework and 
virtual standstill in the institutional reform remaining major impediments.  
According to the OECD, it’s not the laws on the books but rather the selective 
enforcement and arbitrary decisions by the judiciary that plague the legal system.   
Goals for the Future 
 In his 2004 Address to the Federal Assembly, President Putin identified 4 
national priorities: 1) increasing the quality of life, 2) moving towards the 
economy of knowledge, 3) establishing an effective state, and 4) providing 
national security.  In essence, Putin has suggested that an effective state would be 
able to create sustainable economic growth and therefore would successfully 
accomplish the first 2 goals.  
 President Putin emphasized the need for sustainable economic growth that 
would raise living standards and Russia’s prestige.  The president clearly 
emphasizes Russia’s potential to be a great power, as he appeals that the economy 
must grow faster in order to:  
“avoid being relegated to the backwaters of the world economy…We must grow 
faster than the rest of the world if we want to take the lead…This is a question of our 
economic survival. It is a question of ensuring that Russia takes its deserved place in 
these changing international conditions” (Federal Assembly Address May 26, 2004). 
 In order to keep the economy growing and Russia competitive, President 
Putin suggests that Russia’s greatest asset is its people (“2004 Address”).  Despite 
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the fact that Russia’s population may be the sources of competitive advantage, 
when talking about Russia’s economy it is impossible not to focus on the energy 
industry.   In order to develop its ‘strategic asset’ Russia would need to use 
effectively the revenues secured from the energy sector to address problems 
affecting its human capital, in the spheres of health, education and social welfare 
(as identified by Putin in his 2004 Address to the Federal Assembly).  
“Our economy is still very much dependent on raw materials exports. Of course, our 
natural resource wealth is Russia's natural competitive advantage, and this is not 
something we should be afraid of saying. But an even greater natural competitive 
advantage is the great intellectual potential our country possesses. This potential should 
be turned into a driving force that will take the Russian economy further in high-
technology and high-revenue sectors” (Putin “Speech to the election supporters”). 
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Russia’s Political Economy, or Why Putin’s Success? 
Irrespective of the driving forces behind the economic recovery in the 
wake of the 1998 financial crisis, the economy has been growing.  Whether 
Putin’s economic team or the external events triggered this growth does not 
matter much when voters go to the polls.  However, the economic transformation 
did have a significant impact on the Kremlin and its policies as applied to other 
issues in Russia and abroad.  Furthermore, Putin’s drive to establish market 
economy in Russia has been helped, not hindered, by the strong central 
government.  
Economy for Putin 
It is a well known, and widely discussed that the economy has a large 
impact on how the citizens vote and how satisfied they are with their government.  
The case is probably even stronger in countries with the volatile economic past, 
such as the transition economies of Eastern Europe, where people are seeking a 
respite from the economic uncertainties that they experienced in the 1990s.    
One of the important factors for Putin’s success with the Russian voters 
lies in the initial economic recovery.  The rise in global oil prices in 1999 
combined with the economic growth following the 1998 crisis gave Putin enough 
resources to start and more importantly carry through reform initiatives.  Kremlin 
successfully raised tax and export revenues (due to increase in economic activity 
and higher oil prices), which then paid off the old wage arrears and substantial 
portion of the foreign debt, as well as, financed the current deficits (Berglof 57).  
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Payment of wages, which was a huge problem under Yeltsin, would in itself make 
any president popular.  
A number of studies support the thesis that economic performance 
influences voter behavior.  Amber L. Seligson and Joshua A. Tucker did one of 
the earlier studies on Russian voting behavior.  Tucker and Seligson were mainly 
concerned with Russian voter preference for communist leader Gennady 
Zyuganov, who garnered a substantial amount of votes in the 1996 election; he 
came in second to Yeltsin and forced a second round run-off, which the 
incumbent Yeltsin won 53.8% to 40.3%.  
Tucker and Seligson thesis is that predisposal to authoritarian leaders and 
regime was the main predictor of voters casting their ballots in favor of ex-
authoritarian leaders, such as Zyuganov.   The findings were collected and 
analyzed based on a survey of 1,992 people.  When testing for authoritarian 
regime preference the respondents were given a choice that included “the Soviet 
system we had in our country before perestroika.”  
Another question asked the respondents to rate on a five-point scale from 
strongly agree to strongly disagree the statement “it is better to live in a society 
with strict order than to give people so much freedom that they may destroy 
society.”  It should be noted that preference for order by respondents was 
interpreted as an indirect indicator of preference for authoritarianism in this study 
and the authors have acknowledged that there may be substantial differences on 
what a respondent would view as order and authoritarianism.   
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The authors found that voter dissatisfaction with economic conditions had 
an unmistakable and substantial positive impact on the vote for Zyuganov, and at 
the same time had an unmistakable and substantial negative impact on the vote for 
Boris Yeltsin.  Those who are most dissatisfied with the economy over the last 
year were 29% more likely to support Zyuganov than those who were most 
satisfied.  Although the authors also find substantial correlation in preference for 
the authoritarian regime and leadership and the vote for ex-authoritarian leader 
Zyuganov, the implication is that the economy has a clear and substantive effect 
on voter preference.  
The authors conclude that to a degree, voters in Russia appeared to vote 
for Zyuganov because they were dissatisfied with the state of the economy. 
Furthermore, the authors also analyzed socio-demographic characteristics of 
Zyuganov support base – older, poorer and those employed in working class 
industries – and concluded that the communist leader was predominantly popular 
with the “losers” of the economic transition.  This too points to economic impact 
on support for political figures.   
At the same time, the authors find that in Russia, Zyuganov’s support 
increases by 45% on the basis of preference for the former Soviet political system 
after controlling for socio-demographic characteristics and economy evaluation.  
The authors suggest that this may have troubling implications for Russia’s 
political developments while President Putin is in office.  Since voters are casting 
ballots based on current economic conditions, but with the expectation of 
authoritarian regime, this may well indicate disconcerting future for Russian 
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democracy, as well as, genuine support not only for Putin and economic progress, 
but also authoritarian government (see Appendix B for the results of the study).  
The authors’ final question of whether economic dissatisfaction breeds 
preference for authoritarian forms of government, and if it does, then would 
economic progress concurrently improve the outlook for democratic consolidation 
appears to be moot, as both support for Putin and economic growth are moving in 
the same direction.   
2000 Elections 
Before looking at the most important approval rating for the Putin regime 
– measured by the 2004 elections - we may consider the 2000 elections to see the 
initial predispositions to the President.  Not only did Putin win elections by a 
convincing margin, but he did so with a broad base of support – he won 84 out of 
89 Russia’s region and at that he won 56 of those regions by absolute majority 
(Colton, McFaul 185). Furthermore, Putin’s supporters had ecumenical support 
among supporters for different parties and those who voted for Putin came from 
almost every socioeconomic background (186).  It is evident then that the 
President has been able to achieve broad based support regionally and 
sociologically. Why? 
According to Timothy Colton and McFaul, an average voter was 24% 
more likely to vote for Putin if he had the most positive outlook on the state of the 
economy and 36% more likely if he had the best assessment of political situation 
(187).  In addition, an individual who wanted the government to increase and 
accelerate market reforms was 12% more likely to vote for Putin than someone 
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who wanted to return to socialist economy (188).  Overall, approval of his 
performance as Prime Minister and as interim president mattered the most (190), 
followed by approval of Yeltsin and then evaluations of Putin’s personal qualities, 
issue opinions and his competence as a ruler (197).   
Here we can conclude that Putin was initially popular with the Russian 
public, although economic performance had little to do with their choice.  This is 
not surprising. Although the economic recovery had begun at that point, there 
were no assurances that it would be sustained.  The impact of positive 
developments was still not felt by much of the population. Yet, those who voted 
for Putin felt that he had done well and was competent to lead to the country 
further (see Appendix C for results of the study).  
2004 Elections 
In Russia particularly, according to the study done by Rose et al., the 
economy’s performance is the single most important factor for the approval of the 
regime, notwithstanding whether it’s a popular endorsement of the regime or 
resigned acceptance25.  (See Appendix D for tables). 
According to the Rose et al study, economic performance can account for 
most of the high approval given to the Russian political regime (208).  Rose et al., 
put forward 5 factors that may influence regime approval in Russia: 1) 
socialization, 2) political values, 3) Putin’s personal appeal, 4) expectations, and 
5) economic performance (204).   
                                                 
25 The distinction is the basic argument of the Rose et al study.  The authors’ hypothesis is that 
Russian citizens have a resigned acceptance of the government and its autocratic tendencies, 
which is based on the improvement in the overall economic situation and perception that a) the 
government is unlikely to change b) there are no other regimes that Russians would prefer as an 
alternative to the current regime (212).  
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Briefly, the findings are as follows 1) there is no clear consensus among 
the Russians about the political and economic regime that existed during the time 
of the Soviet Union, although 58% view both positively; 2) most view democracy 
positively, but do not believe that Russia is a clear cut democracy; 3) President 
Putin enjoys very high support – on a 1 to 10 scale – 62% are positive and another 
17% are at a neutral point of 5; 4) a clear majority of Russians does not expect 
and many do not want a regime change; furthermore, most respondents regardless 
of how they feel about the current regime do not seriously think that alternative 
regime scenarios are possible (204-6).  
Finally, 5) the majority of Russians view the economy as improving, even 
though a much lower share perceives and expects their own situation to improve 
on the microeconomic level.  According to the 2004 responses, 60% feel positive 
about the national economy, while after the 2000 Presidential election, the 
number was only 29%.  At the same time, only 27% were satisfied with their 
economic situation in 2004, a similar number to that of 2000 (205).  
 Multiple regression explaining approval of the Russian government 
accounts for a considerable part of the variance (42.5%) and shows that economic 
performance accounts for nearly all of that when testing the variables that factor 
into regime approval in Russia.  A bloc regressions that includes only two 
economic indicators (overall economic outlook and individual economic 
prospects) account for 37.7% of the variance.  In a full regression with all 16 
indicators, the total increases only by 4.8% (208).  
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In the full multiple regression, the Beta value for economic performance’s 
influence on regime approval is 0.5, which is 5 to 12 times higher than the Beta 
value of any of the other significant influences.  Interestingly, the influence of 
microeconomic satisfactions, at the level of respondent’s family economic 
outlook, has a much lower Beta of 0.8.  Therefore, not only is the economy the 
most important determinant of how Russians view the government, the overall 
economic performance is much more important than improvements at the 
household level.  Although there may be debate as to the sustainability of 
economic growth, there is evident improvement in the macroeconomic variables, 
which is especially in contrast with the pre-Putin years of economic stagnation 
and depression.  
Overall, the findings indicate that economic performance is the most 
important factor in how Russians view the political regime, while all other 
indicators contribute to the rejection of other possible regimes, thereby 
strengthening the current regime (with political expectations being the second 
most important) (212). 
We may then conclude based on the evidence from several Russian 
elections that the economy is a highly influential determinant of the voting 
behavior of the mass public, if not the most important factor. 
Disclaimer  
It should be acknowledged that the economy is not the only factor that has 
played an important role in allowing re-emergence of authoritarian trends. One of 
the most important factors is the threat of terrorism, as well as, the national 
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response to terrorism.  Special emphasis should be put on the Beslan tragedy here. 
Although the importance of these factors should be undoubtedly acknowledged, it 
is beyond the scope of this study to address more factors that have allowed 
consolidation of Kremlin’s power. (The reader may also see how other factors 
figure into President’s approval ratings by consulting the studies reported in the 
appendices).  
Putin for Economy 
 Economic growth has done wonders for the support of political regime of 
Vladimir Putin. Yet the sustained growth of the economy did not occur on its 
own.  President Putin systematically strengthened the state and has used this to 
increase power to implement important reforms to improve the efficiency and 
overall functioning of the Russian economy.  
In the Spring 2001 legislative session, Putin and his team succeeded in 
passing 80% of the legislation that had been planned, which included 29 reform 
laws on such controversial issues as taxation, land ownership, pensions, labor 
relations and law enforcement (Berglof 60-1).   This reinforces the thesis that at 
least part of Putin’s motivation for consolidation of power came from the desire to 
implement reforms that would improve functioning and efficiency of the 
economy.  
Interestingly enough, a lot of these economic reforms were formulated in 
1996-97, when Yeltsin was still in the executive office (60-1).  This suggests that 
President Putin had something that President Yeltsin lacked – support of the 
legislature.  Putin’s ability to streamline and shore up support for himself and 
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upgrade the presidential power has enabled him to push through the Duma the 
same economic reform legislation that Yeltsin struggled with.  The difference was 
that Yeltsin lacked Putin’s amount of support and presidential power to pursue 
these changes.   
In addition, centralization of power and revenues at the federal level has 
allowed President Putin to extend the central government’s influence into the 
country’s vast 89 regions.  During the 1990s, the federal government was very 
weak, which has led to corruption and swindling of state assets at the local levels 
– this trend has now been at least somewhat reversed.  Additionally, the central 
government may use its power and influences in the region to develop areas, 
which lack natural advantages, such as resources and/or constrained by the high 
costs of production (Lynch 163).  Previously, the disadvantage regions were 
powerless to improve their situation due to the grab-all-you –can atmosphere 
among all regional governments that existed under Yeltsin’s regime.  
If we consider the economic geography argument, increased investment in 
Russia is one of the top government priorities, not only because it would increase 
the overall growth of the economy, but also because it could ensure that all of 
Russia’s 89 regions continue to develop ensuring stability and national security.  
If the state decides to decrease its participation in the economy, the results could 
be disastrous for regional development26.   In other words, the state should assume 
the responsibility of distributing the wealth to those regions that could be 
                                                 
26 Due to its vast territory, severity of climate and the fact that Russia is virtually landlocked, the 
costs of production are much higher than in other countries, therefore private investors are 
unlikely to assume those costs. For example Artic and Siberian regions have virtually no chance to 
develop if the state does not direct resources there (Lynch 222-4). 
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competitive right now, and those who could emerge as competitors in the 
medium-term, without neglecting the bulk of country where industrial production 
is too costly (Lynch 205).  
President Putin has also undertaken a number of initiatives that have 
created a favorable atmosphere for reform.  Even investors concerned with 
democratic progress in Russia would not argue against government stability and 
state ability to pass and implement laws favorable to investment as indispensable 
factors for attracting foreign investment.  
Despite much welcome attempts by senior officials to reassure investors 
regarding the safety of investing in Russia, “concerns about the ability to control 
Russia’s pervasive bureaucracy linger” (“Article IV” 27). In addition the virtual 
standstill of economic reforms has also contributed to the negative investment 
climate (6). Government interference in private business, especially such large 
scale and protracted case as the Yukos Affair has done much to raise unease 
regarding investment in Russia.  As the IMF points out, the Yukos Affair has 
“raised the specter of interventionism and increased the heavy-handedness by 
regulatory and law enforcement agencies” (“Article IV” 2).  
On the other hand, the case has also done some good for doing business in 
Russia. The crackdown on Khodorkovsky was a welcome development for non-
billionaire Russians and foreign investors.  The government is now firmly in 
charge, which sets up the stage for Russia to be able to do business as any other 
developed country, instead of succumbing to the arbitrary rules of the oligarchs 
(Maas).  At the same time, just as the administration originally intended, the 
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oligarchs now know that it is in their best interests to align company policies with 
those of the Kremlin.  The president of one of the largest oil companies in Russia, 
Lukoil, Vagit Alekperov recently stated “I can’t afford to be indifferent to 
politics…I have only one task connected with politics, to help the country and the 
company” (Maas).  
Despite government interference in the private sector with the Yukos 
Affair, Putin statements have always been pro-business.  And it appears as though 
the government is indeed moving towards a second phase of reforms (Beadel 1).  
For 2006, the Kremlin has introduced initiatives and reforms on 3 different issues: 
state company initial public offerings (IPOs), utilities sector and regulatory 
reform.  
 Reform in the electricity sector was sorely needed because of rampant 
corruption due to the vested interests, regulatory and international trade issues. 
After the Moscow power-outage, which left Moscow into chaos and confusion 
last summer, the government embarked on the course of decisive action.  (The 
momentum was bolstered by the 2005 winter shortages).  The government has 
promised to attract foreign and domestic investment in order to solve problems in 
this sector - a huge step forward (Beadle 1).  
 Next on the agenda has been increasing foreign investment in the state 
companies.  Both state oil company Rosneft and energy giant Gazprom are due to 
float some of their equity on foreign stock exchange markets in 2006. 
 As far as regulation is concerned here the government has also announced 
new initiatives.  The head of the Federal Service for Financial Markets, Oleg 
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Vyugin announced initiatives for the Russian capital market that include clearing 
facilities, insider trading rules, corporate governance, and pension fund 
development.  As Beadel points out, Putin seems to have enough power to make 
sure that all of these changes happen (2).  
President Putin has clearly stated that as part of his vision for an ‘effective 
state’ are economic sectors which must be predominantly controlled by the state. 
These would include “some infrastructure facilities, enterprises that fulfill state 
defense orders, mineral deposits of strategic importance for the future of the 
country and future generations, as well as infrastructural monopolies” (Address to 
the Federal Assembly 2005).  
Although the government has restricted foreign ownership in some of the 
strategic industries, existing restrictions on private investment are better than total 
denial of foreign ownership in the economy.  To Putin’s credit, in his Address to 
the Federal Assembly in 2005 he also underlined the importance of creating 
favorable conditions for private investment in all of the other sectors.  The 
President emphasized that the government has not done nearly enough in that 
sphere, and therefore would work in this area.   
Finally, Putin has also signaled that Russia would seek to integrate itself 
with the rest of the world economy, by actively lobbying to join the World trade 
Organization (WTO), which Russia expects to do before the end of 2006. Russia 
has joined important international agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol on 
Global Warming.  In 2006, Russian Federation began its tenure at the head of the 
Group of Industrial Nations (G8).  Putin has also made changes in the trade 
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environment by improving on issues such as individual property rights, regulation 
of service industries, reduction in government subsidies and public procurement.   
Just like in his first term, in his second term, President Putin is likely to 
use his extensive power to push through what he sees as the necessary reforms to 
enhance the economy.   
Looking Towards the Future 
 Russia has the potential to grow more than 5 or 6%, and perhaps achieve 
President Putin’s target of doubling the GDP by 2013.  Since 1998, the Russian 
economy has made significant strides, especially as it increased its total factor 
productivity, which led to increase in real wages and consumption.  This has 
happened despite the low investment-to-GDP ratio (as compared to other 
emerging market economies).  This fact suggests that there is substantial potential 
for growth from increased investment, which the government recognizes and has 
stated to be as one of its primary goals. 
 In order to attract more investment, the administration must work to 
implement structural reforms.  It must also introduce improvements in public 
infrastructure and take action to reassure investors, which are concerned with state 
interventionism (Yukos Affair).  If these measures are carried out, the economy 
can grow at a rate of 6-7% annually (“Article IV” 17). 
 It is then evident that Putin has used and intends to use the increased 
power of the central government, the strong state and his own executive power to 
carry out reforms in Russia which will benefit the economy and the public.  
Therefore, the argument would then be that contingent on all other factors (such 
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as terrorism for example) staying more or less the same, the public will continue 
to have very high support of President Vladimir Putin, who will continue to 
augment the powers of the state and the executive with an aim of carrying out 
more market reforms and creating a stable environment for sustained economic 
development.   
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Sustainability of Market Economy, Managed Democracy 
 Putin’s first administration was marked by undeniable reforms to establish 
stability and create a market economy in Russia.  There is no doubt that external 
factors, such as ruble devaluation and high oil prices were extremely important 
for initial growth. But at the same time, Kremlin also introduced a vast number of 
reforms that have put the economy on a growth path (“Article IV” 14).  
 Subsequently, however, the reforms have substantially slowed and 
stagnation had set in.  Leading financial institutions have decried the slowing pace 
of reforms.  The IMF, states: “the oil wealth is not being harnessed in support of 
reforms that could raise potential GDP growth…At best Russia risks missing an 
opportunity to accelerate growth over the long run.” (“Russia –Concluding 
Statement”)  Michael McFaul cautions that a new correlation may have merged in 
Russia “growing authoritarianism and declining economic growth rates” (309)27.   
Current System’s Detriments 
In general autocratic governments tend to stave off reform in times of 
economic prosperity.  The temptation to introduce populist measures has not 
escaped the Russian government.  In general, Russian economic experts agree that 
reforms were “running well behind target” and attributed the government’s 
complacent attitude regarding reforms to high oil prices (“Article IV” 24). 
In late 2005, the Kremlin announced that part of the oil stabilization fund, 
which is used to collect excess revenues from oil sales, would be used to pay for 
                                                 
27 McFaul based his conclusion in sagging economic growth in the first quarter of 2005, when the 
oil prices were high yet Russia’s growth rate was below expectations.  The dip in growth was the 
short term impact of the Yukos case, and since then investors have begun to take keen interest in 
Russia, with growth rates going back up.  
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the gap in the pension fund that occurred after a cut in the unified social tax.  Yet, 
this move does not necessarily indicate that the Russian government would stop 
all reform and would slide into an autocratic government relying on oil revenues 
to buy support28.   
At the same time, the danger for Russia’s economy lies in the same factors 
that fueled its initial success.  Michael McFaul points out that at its core Putin’s 
state building has been aimed at eliminating opposition forces – the checks and 
balances on the executive’s power, rather than on increasing the effectiveness of 
state institutions (308).  
More importantly, although centralization of power has helped President 
Putin to introduce necessary reforms to the economy, it has also reduced the 
accountability of the executive branch.  If the government agenda changes there 
would be little that could be done to influence a policy of continued economic 
liberalization.  This is a very real threat come presidential elections of 2008, when 
a new figure will take over the executive seat at the Kremlin. 
In the future, the authoritarian structure of the government may damage 
economic performance. A concentration of power within the executive branch 
undermines the balance of power and therefore weakening the accountability of 
the administration (Berglof 147).  Putin may use his powers today to push through 
favorable economic legislation, but he may also use those powers to encroach on 
citizens rights, should he feel necessary to do so - a perfect example of that is the 
Yukos Affair.   
                                                 
28 Only 5% of economic experts at the World Economic Summit in St Petersburg, Russia thought 
that Russia would succumb to the ‘oil curse’ form of government (Russia and the World: 
Scenarios for the Future). 
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As Pavel Baev29 argues, the main problem “is the effort to advance a 
modernization project via reforms from above. The bureaucratic nature of the 
regime reinforced and shaped by the special service networks, diminishes Putin’s 
ability to do this, while turning Russia inward and backward” (11).  It is also 
important that a regime such as managed democracy requires close supervision. 
As Nikolai Petrov points out a managed democracy system requires “constant 
control from above and given the lack of citizens control, mid-level elites are 
strongly tempted to use the system to their own advantage” (182).  
There are a number of forces created by Putin’s strong state that may and 
probably are planning to challenge future reforms.  The stalwarts of bureaucracy 
and the so-called siloviki30, whose number and power has been greatly expanded 
thanks to the current structure of the state and the government, are likely to 
challenge any reforms infringing on the power and control of the state over the 
economy (i.e. privatization, break up of natural monopolies, increased spending 
on social reform).  Moreover, there is the big social sector and the natural 
monopolies themselves who are unlikely to go down with out a fight (Aslund 
416).   
In addition to the strength of these three groups, there is also the waning 
influence of the liberals and opposition political parties in general in the Duma.  
And, as Russia has regained its footing in the economy, the influence of 
international financial institutions (the IMF, World Bank, etc) has markedly 
                                                 
29 Senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, Norway. 
30 Siloviki are members of the “power institutions” (Defense, interior ministries, etc), usually loyal 
to Putin, but also very much interested in lobbying for their interests – See Baev “The Evolution 
of Putin’s Regime.”  
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diminished as well. Strong central government also has a negative effect on the 
regional support for reform, as incentives and benefits of reform cease to operate 
for the regional governments (Aslund 417).  
Reform No More? 
 In the fiscal budget for 2005 and 2006, expenditure for social welfare is 
about half of that marked for national security and defense.   
Structure of federal budget expenditures 
  
2005 as % of 
GDP 
2006 as % of 
GDP 
Total 16.2 17.5 
National issues 2.46 2.65 
Defense and National 
Security 4.97 4.96 
National Economy 1.29 1.39 
Housing construction 0.05 0.16 
Environmental protection 0.02 0.03 
Education 0.83 0.83 
Culture 0.21 0.21 
Social policy 0.89 0.83 
Transfers 5.1 5.86 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Efremova et. al 
Yet the government’s announced priorities were to develop its human 
resource sector and increase living standards.  While security has been cited as 
one of the 4 main national priorities, progress in achieving one of the goals should 
not come at the expense of others.  Coping with demographic challenges, would 
undoubtedly facilitate the development of the ‘knowledge economy’.  However, 
in order to maintain a strong and central state, Putin may have no choice.  
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 Meanwhile, the necessary institutional reforms are impeded by the strong 
state.  In the last several years, three critical incidents underlined the well-stated 
fact that Russia faces a major impediment to economic growth because of its 
inability to make progress in institutional reform (IMF).  The Yukos Affair, the 
Beslan siege and the 2004 Presidential elections in Ukraine were all dubbed as 
major failures for the Russian government.  Despite the legality of charges 
brought against Yukos and its CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky the case had a poor 
reflection on the rule of law because of the way it was handled, the Beslan attack 
points to the failure of the security services, and the blatant and unsuccessful 
interference in the sovereign election in Ukraine had a poor reflection on the 
foreign policy.  Changes in the legal and institutional environments are badly 
needed if Russia hopes to secure more foreign investment (18).  
Yevgeni Yasin31 points out that institutional reform, especially in the 
administrative section, must not only be carried out (as the government did up to 
2004) but it must also be successful in decreasing corruption and introducing 
greater efficiency to government’s functioning – so far neither effects have 
emerged.  Yasin argues that that is because administrative reforms are 
undermined by the lack of democracy. 
 Finally, as Hardt points out, despite the fact that Putin has control over the 
legislative, budgetary and foreign policy and despite his pragmatic statements on 
economic reforms, changes have been slow in coming.  He has not done much in 
either the human resource or the energy sectors (19).  Words must go hand-in-
                                                 
31 President of Moscow’s Higher School of Economics.  
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hand with deeds if the government plans to firmly remain on the path to 
sustainable growth. 
 The basic conclusion is that Russia is now at a stage where the easy 
reforms are over and now the time has come for it to develop the infrastructure 
and institutions in order to facilitate further growth.   
The Most Likely Scenario 
 In October 2005, nearly 300 business and political leaders and analysts 
from 26 countries came to Moscow for the 10th World Economic Group Summit 
in Russia.  Their overall conclusions may be the cause for optimism - the majority 
of participants believed that Russia would continue to tread along the path of 
economic growth.  Nearly 95% of the participants rejected a scenario in which the 
government would grow completely dependent on energy resources.  In other 
words, the regime is unlikely to start using oil revenues to buy popular support.  
This scenario is dangerous as it would lead to instability and problems such as 
capital flight and drop in investment.  
 At the same time, the majority of participants (60%) also rejected the 
“renaissance” scenario where liberals would gain influence creating a robust GDP 
growth of 5-10% annually.  The scenario focuses on political developments as the 
key factor and predicts that liberals would be in charge of the Kremlin in 2025.  
Although Russia would continue to rely on oil revenues for the next 10 years, 
with liberal influences gaining power, would result in more FDI due to investors’ 
confidence and a highly educated workforce due to government policies. 
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 About half believe that Russia falls within “Clean Fuel Scenario,” 
meaning that it would likely remain a regime with limited democracy, while at the 
same time would experience higher growth rates. Due to the gradual decrease of 
the state’s role in the economy, better management practices would emerge, 
leading to diversification and an increase in FDI.  The scenario predicts that with 
an increase in stability, central government would allow gradual decentralization 
of power with regional governments gaining more influence according to their 
economic weight.  
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Conclusion 
It is not an original proposition that the state of the economy strongly 
influences approval of the government and the voting behavior of the citizens.  
Yet, in Russia during Putin’s administration this axiom has grown to 
unprecedented levels not seen in any of the developed states.  President Putin has 
astonishingly high approval ratings, regularly superceding 70%.  An initial 
observation may propose that this has something to do with autocratic tendencies 
of the Russian regime – an indeed it would be correct.  But Putin and the regime 
cannot force upon the people their own popularity.  Something else is at play here.  
A strong state and potent executive branch have introduced stability and 
sustainable economic improvements to the Russian public.  And herein lies the 
nature of Russia’s market economy, managed democracy regime and the popular 
support behind it. 
Despite all the negative press that the Russian regime has received, the 
macroeconomic picture, as well as popular opinion of the Russian public would 
suggest that there is a substantial variance between the depressing assessments 
and the real situation. It would not be implausible to suggest that Russians have 
no objections to a strong state, where the President has managed to establish a 
working relationship between the legislative and the executive branches, 
increased tax revenues collected by the federal government, showed oligarchs 
who is the boss, and amended the electoral system.  Economic reforms 
implemented a sustained recovery and growth of the Russian economy, a 
welcome development after years of chaos and insecurity.  
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As far as Putin and his administration are concerned, Russia will continue 
on the path of economic growth.  And that in itself should, with time, lead to 
democratic developments.  Sustained economic growth is conducive to increasing 
the numbers of the middle class, who in turn shall seek greater freedom and 
accountability from the Kremlin. In addition, institutional and judicial reforms 
when they are carried out and completed respectively would strengthen the 
possibilities for democratic governance in the future (Colton, McFaul 218).  In 
short, democratic governance cannot exist with out market economy and rule of 
law.  In order to firmly establish those two requirements, a competent state must 
exist first. 
 In spite of all the negative assessments of the current situation in Russia, 
things are looking up and are likely to continue to do so in the future – even if at a 
slower pace than many would like. 
 
69 
Works Cited: 
Aslund, Anders. “Russia’s Economic Transformation under Putin.” Eurasian  
Geography and Economics. 45.6 (2004): 397-420. 
 
Baev, Pavel. “The Evolution of Putin’s Regime Inner Circles and Outer Walls.”  
Problems of Post Communism. 51.6 (Nov/Dec 2004): 3-13.  
 
Berglof. Erik, Anderi Kunov, Julia Shvets and Ksenia Yudaeva. The New  
Political Economy of Russia. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003.  
 
Colton, Timothy and Michael McFaul. Popular Choice and Managed  
Democracy.  Washington D.C.:  Brookings Institution Press, 2003.   
 
Dahl, Robert. Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy. Boston, MA: Yale University  
Press, 1982. 
 
Economic Surveys: Russian Federation, 2004. Moscow, Russia: Organization  
for Economic Cooperation and Development. 12 March 2006. 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/54/32495048.pdf>. 
 
Efremova, M D., A.V. Kosygina, O. E. Petrovsky, S. V. Yakovleva, and Y. G.  
Yasin. The Economy and Investment Climate in Russia. Ed. A V. 
Kosygina. NBF Expert Institute, the American Chamber of Commerce in 
Russia, and Ernst & Young. Moscow, Russia, 2005. 1-28. 10 Jan. 2006. 
 
Fish, Steven. Democracy Derailed in Russia The failure of Open Politics. New  
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
 
Hanson, Phillip. “Putin and Russia’s Economic Transformation.”  Eurasian  
Geography and Economics. 45.6 (2004): 421-428. 
 
Kotkin, Stephen. Armageddon Averted The Soviet Collapse 1970-2000. New  
York: Oxford University Press, 2001.  
 
Lynch, Allen. How Russia Is Not Ruled Reflections on Russian Political  
Development. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
 
Maas, Peter. “The Triumph of the Quiet Tycoon.” NY Times Magazine. 1 Aug.  
2004. 10 Jan 2006. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/01/magazine/01RUSSIAN.html?page
wanted=1&ei=5070&en=2c7afcd3b5100df4&ex=1144382400>. 
 
McFaul, Michael. “Russian and the West: A Dangerous Drift.” Current History.  
104.684 (Oct 2005): 307-312.  
 
 
70 
McTernan, Benedict F., ed. “Russia Country Forecast Comment & Analysis.”  
Political Risk Services, Inc. East Syracuse: The PRS Group, Inc., 2000. 
 
---, “Russia Country Forecast Comment & Analysis.” Political Risk Services, Inc.  
East Syracuse: The PRS Group, Inc., 2001.  
 
---, “Russia Country Forecast Comment & Analysis.” Political Risk Services, Inc.  
East Syracuse: The PRS Group, Inc., 2003.  
 
---, “Russia Country Forecast Comment & Analysis.” Political Risk Services,  
Inc. East Syracuse: The PRS Group, Inc., 2006.  
 
Petrov, Nikolai. “From Managed Democracy to Sovereign Democracy” PONARS  
Policy Memo No. 396. Center for Political-Geographic Research. Dec 
2005.  
 
Putin, Vladimir V. “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly.” Federal  
Assembly, Moscow, Russia. 25 Apr. 2004. 12 Jan. 2006 
<www.kremlin.ru>. 
 
---, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly.” Federal Assembly,  
Moscow, Russia. 24 May 2005. 12 Jan. 2006 <www.kremlin.ru>. 
 
---,  “Rossiya Na Rubzhe Tisyachletya.” (Russia on the Threshold of  
the Millennium) Nezavisimya Gazeta. 30 Dec. 1999.  
 
Rose, Richard, Neil Munro and William Mishler. “Resigned Acceptance of an  
Incomplete Democracy: Russia’s Political Equilibrium.” Post-Soviet 
Affairs. 20.3 (2004) 195-218.  
 
“Russia and the World: Scenarios for the Future.” World Economic Forum.  
 
Shleifer, Andrei and Daniel Treisman. “A Normal Country.” Foreign Affairs. 83.2  
(Mar 2004) 20-38.  
 
Shevtsova, Lilia. Putin’s Russia. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for  
International Peace, 2003.  
 
Shlapentokh, V. “Putin’s First Year In Office: The New Regime’s Uniqueness In  
Russian History.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 34.1 (2001) 
371-399. 
 
Seligson, Amber L. and Joshua A. Tucker. “Feeding the Hand That Bit You:  
Voting For Ex-Authoritarian Rulers in Russia and Bolivia.” 
Demokratizatsiya. 13.1 (Winter 2005) 11-32. 
 
 
71 
“Sotsial’no-politicheskaya Situatsiya v Rossii v Fevrale 2006 Goda” (Socio- 
political Situation in Russia in February 2006). Moscow, Russia: Levada 
Center, 3 March 2006. 12 Jan. 2006. <http://www.levada.ru>.  
 
“US calls Russia a market economy.” BBC News. 2 June 2002. 14 Apr 2005. 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2032498.stm>. 
 
Voice and Accountability Ratings. World Bank. 12 March 2006.  
<http://info.worldbank.org >. 
 
Yasin, Evgenii. “Window of Economic Opportunity or the Graveyard of Hope?”  
Novoya Vremia. No.24, June 2004.  
 
Zimmerman, William. “Slavophiles and Westernizers Redux: Contemporary  
Russian Elite Perspectives.” Post-Soviet Affairs. 21.3 (2003) 183-209.  
  
 
 
  Appendices 
Appendix A 
 
Indicators of Status of Reforms in Emerging Economies 
 
Indicators are on the scale of 1- 4, with 1 being very little progress in transition from planned 
economy, and 4 being standards achieved comparable to those in developed markets.  
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Efremova et al (6). 
 
Russia’s Rating on Reforms: 
Share of private sector in the GDP - 3 
Privatization of major enterprises - 3 
Privatization of minor enterprises - 4 
Structural reforms at enterprises - 2 
Price deregulation - 4 
Foreign trade and currency system -3  
Antimonopoly system - 2 
Banking reforms / interest rate deregulation - 3 
Stock markets and non-banking fin. institutions - 2 
Infrastructural reforms - 2 
Avg. Score: 2.8 
 
  Appendices 
Appendix B 
 
Estimated Binomial Logit Coefficients and (Standard Errors) of 
Vote for Zyuganov N=1992 
  
Category                    Variable                         
Socioeconomic           Gender                            -.043                               (.112) 
and demographic       Age                                  1.91 ***                       (.289) 
characteristics            High education                -.508 **                        (.167) 
                                    Mid education                  -.308 *                          (.133) 
                                    Low income                      .378 **                         (.124) 
                                    Working class                   .368 **                         (.109) 
Retrospective             Crime                               -.730 **                        (.279) 
voting                          Unemployment                 .191                             (.140) 
                                     Retrospective economy    -2.74 ***                     (.226) 
Authoritarian             Soviet political system 2.22***     (.124) 
attitudes                      Order vs. freedom 1.06***     (.301) 
                                     Constant                            -.735 **                      (.216) 
For all variables: *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001. 
Source: Seligson 29 
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Appendix C 
Colton, McFaul Study of 2000 Presidential Elections 
 
The following are explanations for the survey administered of the Russian public 
in the run-up to the 2000 Presidential elections.  Explanation cited here are the 
ones that had an effect on the vote for Putin and are not self explanatory. Full 
methodology could be found in the text Popular Choice and Managed Democracy 
on pages 232-240. 
• Social Characteristics – self explanatory 
• Current conditions – self explanatory 
• Partisanship – allegiance to main political parties (KPRF, Unity, OVR, 
SPS, Yabloko, LDPR and any other party) 
• Issue Opinions 
Left- Right – how respondents classified themselves on an 11 point scale, with 1 
being the most to the left, and 11 the most to the right 
Democratic Regime – 4 possible responses: 1) pre-perestroika regime, 2) pre-
perestroika regime but more democratic. 3) current system, 4) Western 
democracy.  
Presidentialism – how powerful should the president be on a 1-5 scale – 1 a lot 
more powerful than the parliament, and 5 a lot less powerful than the parliament. 
• Evaluation of the Incumbents – on a 5 point scale – 1fully approve, 5 fully 
disapprove 
• Leadership Qualities – 4 point scale for each: intelligence, strength, 
integrity and empathy 
• Issue Competence – how the candidates would deal with the following 
problems: 
providing social guarantees, improving economy, ensuring human rights and 
democratic freedoms, Chechnya, promoting Russia’s interests abroad, fighting 
crime and corruption. 
 
Total Effect of Blocs of Explanatory Variables on 
Presidential Vote, 2000 
Bloc of variables Putin  Zyuganov 
Weighted avg. of 
absolute variables 
Current Conditions 0.23 -0.17 0.20 
Partisanship 0.16 0.55 0.30 
Issue Opinions -0.47 0.47 0.43 
Evaluation of 
Incumbent 0.56 -0.31 0.45 
Leadership qualities 0.48 0.45 0.45 
Issue Competence 0.34 0.23 0.30 
All of the variables for both Putin and Zyuganov have the significance level of  p≤.01 
Source: Colton, McFaul 239 
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Total Effects on the Presidential Vote, 2000 
Explanatory variables Putin Zyuganov 
Social characteristics 
Community size 0.03 -0.10** 
Education 0.03 -0.16** 
Ethnic non-Russian 0.06 -0.02 
Age group -0.08 0.15** 
Former member of the CPSU -0.08 0.11** 
Consumption -0.08 -0.13** 
Woman 0.06** -0.01 
Moscow -0.05 -0.02 
South 0.00 0.03 
East -0.08* 0.06** 
Current Conditions 
Gained in 1990s 0.06 -0.09 
Pocketbook ecn assessments 0.09 -0.12** 
Sociotropic ecn assessments 0.24** -0.15** 
Assessments of democratization 0.36** -0.25** 
  
Partisanship 0.16** -0.55** 
Issue Opinions 
Left-right 0.35** -0.41** 
Market Reform 0.12* -0.03 
Independent Chechnya -0.06 0.02 
Democratic Regime 0.23** -0.23** 
Presidentialism 0.26** -0.14** 
Centralization -0.01 -0.01 
Strongman leader 0.12** -0.02 
  
Evaluation of incumbents 
Yeltsin 0.25** -0.14** 
Putin 0.73** -0.39** 
  
Leadership qualities 0.75** 0.52** 
Issue Competence 0.38** 0.52** 
For all variables: *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01 
Source: Colton, McFaul 238 
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Appendix C 
Rose, Munro and Mishler Study of Regime Support, 2004 
 
Economic Performance as Chief Influence on Regime 
Approval 
Dependent variable - Rating current regime in 2004 
  b Beta 
  
Variance explained 
(R2): 42.5% 
Socialization (6.4%) 
Age -0.01 -0.05 
Education Ns ns 
Socio-economic status Ns ns 
Gender: female Ns Ns 
Past political system -0.07 -0.09** 
Past economic system 0.06 0.07** 
Values (12.3%) 
Desired level of democracy ns ns 
Democracy: people can influence 
govt ns ns 
Democracy: officials obey law 0.23 0.04 
Appreciate increased freedom 0.21 0.07** 
Country in right direction 0.46 0.05** 
Economic Performance (37.7%) 
Present economic system 0.50 0.50** 
Present family economic situation 0.45 0.08** 
Putin's personal appeal (12.2%) 
performance rating 0.14 0.08** 
Expectations (7.2%) 
Alt regime likelihood ns ns 
Expected democracy level in 5 yrs 0.20 0.09** 
 
- Beta and b values are for the regression in which all independent variables are entered together. 
- Figures in parenthesis (i.e. socialization, values, etc), show variance explained by each block of 
variables on their own. 
** Significant correlation at ≤.01 level, all other figures are significant at the ≤.05 level, ns – not 
significant 
Source: New Russia Barometer XIII (Rose 209); N=1,602 
 
 
 
